3 Presentations

• 
  10:30 AM - 10:55 AM

  Analysis of Interaction between Barriers of Supplier’s Quality Management

  • Hassan Mukhtar, presenter, Université Concordia
  • Anjali Awasthi, Concordia University
  • Andrea Schiffauerova, Université Concordia

  The study has been done to find out the important barrier to supplier’s quality management.

  We identified seven important barriers to quality management performance and used the ISM

  approach to find out their contextual relationship.

  SSIM was developed and then reach ability matrix was made to find binary relationship among

  barriers. Graph was constructed to find the classification of these barriers.

• 
  10:55 AM - 11:20 AM

  A Two-Phase Approach Based on Floyd’s Algorithm for the Transshipment Problem

  • Dalia Almaatani, Laurentian University
  • Salimata G. Diagne, Université Cheikh Anta Diop
  • El Moctar Diop, École Superieure de Commerce
  • Youssou Gningue, Laurentian University
  • Matthias P. Takouda, presenter, Laurentian University

  Transshipment Problems can be modeled as Network problems resulting in problems that are large in size and more complex when compared to the original one. We propose a two-phase approach combining Floyd’s algorithm to reduce the problem to a small Transportation Problem whose initial solution is obtained via the Modified Vogel Method.

• 
  11:20 AM - 11:45 AM

  Design Quality Versus Cost-Reducing R&D and the Double Marginalization Problem

  • Fouad El Ouardighi, presenter, ESSEC Business School
  • Victoire Denoyel, ESSEC Business School
  • Juan-Carlos Espinoza, ESSEC Business School

  We develop a dynamic game of collaboration between a manufacturer and its supplier, where the fundamental issue is, for each player, how to allocate own resources between improving the design quality of a finished product and reducing its production cost. The supplier has the option either to update its transfer price throughout the game or to set a constant transfer price from the outset of the game. In dynamic games, the players’ strategy depends on whether they commit to a predetermined plan of actions during the whole game so that their decisions can only be based on time (open-loop strategy), or they make contingent decisions based on the information on the rival’s reaction to a change in the current state of the game, which allows for strategic interaction to take place throughout the game (closed-loop strategy). In order to distinguish between dynamic and strategic effects, we derive the open loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria, with the cooperative solution as a benchmark.