11:00 AM - 11:25 AM
Computing Perfect Nash Equilibria for Polymatrix Games
This paper sets two alternate definitions of Perfect Nash Equilibria for Polymatrix Games. We present two linear programming formulations to identify perfect extreme equilibria and enumerate all Selten Maximal Subsets for polymatrix games. We report computational experiments on randomly generated Polymatrix games with different size and density.
11:25 AM - 11:50 AM
(Anti-) Coordination Problems with Sparce Water Resources
This paper analyses a groundwater pumping differential game where agents have homogeneous characteristics. We show that there may exist multiple (and possibly simultaneous) equilibria, some of them being asymmetric: for instance, a group of farmers may opt for groundwater extraction while another group chooses rainwater storage. Open-loop and feedback equilibria are computed and compared.
11:50 AM - 12:15 PM
The Return Function: A New Tool for Mechanism Designers
In a very large range of elds, a mechanism needs to be defined to enable the interaction of agents. It usually is the responsibility of a person or a group, called the mechanism designer. It is crucial that he chooses the right rules of the game, so that the result of the game is satisfying, even though agents behave strategically. In the seminar, we will give examples of such situations. We will also present tools that can help mechanism designers optimize his mechanism.