Including an Industrial Optimization Day

HEC Montréal, May 7 - 9, 2012


HEC Montréal, May 7 — 9, 2012

Schedule Authors My Schedule
Cal add eabad1550a3cf3ed9646c36511a21a854fcb401e3247c61aefa77286b00fe402

WB3 Chaîne d'approvisionnement / Supply Chain

May 9, 2012 11:00 AM – 12:15 PM

Location: Metro inc.

Chaired by Angel Ruiz

3 Presentations

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    11:00 AM - 11:25 AM

    Designing Activity-Based Supply Chain Networks under Uncertainty

    • Marc-André Carle, presenter, Université Laval
    • Alain Martel, Université Laval

    An approach to design supply chain networks operating under uncertainty is presented. A
    stochastic programming model based on activity graphs, resource acquisition and deployment
    options is first formulated. A Collaborating Agent Teams metaheuristic developed to solve the
    model is then proposed. Numerical results for several test problems are finally presented.

  • Cal add eabad1550a3cf3ed9646c36511a21a854fcb401e3247c61aefa77286b00fe402
    11:25 AM - 11:50 AM

    Production Capacity and Pricing Equilibrium Strategies in a Dynamic Supply Chain

    • Fouad El Ouardighi, presenter, ESSEC Business School
    • Gary Erickson, University of Washington

    We adopt a dynamic framework to study the pricing and capacity investment decisions in a dyadic supply chain which consists of a supplier and a manufacturer governed by a wholesale price contract. An integrated supply chain assumes that there exists a centralized decision maker that fully coordinates the pricing and capacity decisions. A decentralized supply chain, on the other hand, means that the supplier and the manufacturer are involved in a noncooperative game-theoretic situation. In such a game, there are different decision rules—open-loop, closed-loop, feedback—that are available to the supply chain participants. The critical issue that we examine is to which decision rule most efficiently mitigates the double marginalization phenomenon in the context of production capacity dynamics in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one supplier. We develop and analyze a differential game model to examine how the supplier and the manufacturer in a decentralized supply chain determine, with the different decision rules, their production capacities and pricing policies to maximize their profits over an infinite planning horizon. We compare the production capacities and prices that develop, as well as the demand and profit for the complete channel, to that for the coordinated solution.

  • Cal add eabad1550a3cf3ed9646c36511a21a854fcb401e3247c61aefa77286b00fe402
    11:50 AM - 12:15 PM

    A Value Chain Model for End-of-Life Aircrafts

    • Samira Keivanpour, presenter, Université Laval
    • Daoud Aït-Kadi, Université Laval
    • Christian Mascle, École Polytechnique de Montréal

    Aerospace industry is motivated to looking for best strategies to recycle end-of-life
    aircrafts or re-use their components. The interests of different stakeholders and their complex relationship should be studied to ensuring that optimal operation is developed. This study provides a decision support tool for value chain analysis of end-of-life aircrafts.