1 présentation

• 
  15h30 - 17h10

  Combinatorial auctions for the procurement of truckload services : models and solution approaches for inherent decisional problems

  • Monia Rekik, prés., Université Laval

  Combinatorial auctions have already proven their economic efficiency as a trading mechanism for the strategic procurement of truckload (TL) services. Much of this success has been attributed to their ability to capture the economy of scope that characterizes TL operations. In a combinatorial auction, a carrier can express its preferences for a package of contracts in a single bid. In this case, if the bid is won, all the contracts it covers, are assigned to the carrier, otherwise, none of these contracts are won. The design of combinatorial auctions implies solving several decisional problems, mainly: the winner determination problem (WDP), the bid construction or bid generation problem (BCP). In this talk, I will provide an overview of the different variants of WDPs and BCPs addressed in the literature for TL services procurement auctions. I will detail recent approaches that we have proposed to solve several challenging issues related to BCP and WDP in uncertain environments. I will conclude my presentation with the challenges that remain to be raised and the future promising research avenues.