3 présentations

• 
  10h30 - 10h55

  Economic and Environmental Impact of Vertical Decisional Sequences under Horizontal Competition and Integration

  • Fouad El Ouardighi, prés., ESSEC Business School
  • Jeong Eun Sim, KAIST Business School
  • Bowon Kim, KAIST Graduate School of Management, Korea

  This study seeks to characterize both market structures and vertical decision sequences that are most effective in terms of economic competitiveness and environmental sustainability. The following research questions are addressed:
  - Which decision sequence between manufacturer’s abatement effort and retailer’s price is most favorable in terms of net emissions and firms’ profits in vertically integrated markets?
  - Which vertical leadership is most favorable in terms of net emissions and firms’ profits in vertically competitive markets?
  - How do horizontal competition and integration modify the relative impact of the decision sequence between abatement effort and price in vertically integrated markets, on the one hand, and the vertical leadership in vertically competitive markets, on the other hand, on net emissions and firms’ profits?

• 
  10h55 - 11h20

  Price competition induced by partially green -sensitive consumer market

  • Arka Mukherjee, prés.,

  Contemporary research shows that a fully green consumer market is not a close reality. This paper studies the price competition between green and non-green products in a some specific marketing channels with different power structures. We analyze the optimal strategies for different players and find the conditions for profit maximization.

• 
  11h20 - 11h45

  Price competition and quality competition: National brand vs. store brand

  • Tulika Chakraborty, prés., Research Associate
  • Satyaveer S. Chauhan, Concordia University
  • Xiao Huang, John Molson School of Business, Concordia University

  We consider a supply chain in a market segment where a national brand competes with a retailer’s private label product with respect to not only price but also quality. We use the game theoretic model to focus the impact of different channel leadership of quality-setting stage on optimal decisions.