Incluant une Journée industrielle de l'optimisation

HEC Montréal, 7 - 9 mai 2012


HEC Montréal, 7 — 9 mai 2012

Horaire Auteurs Mon horaire

WB7 Théorie des jeux / Game Theory

9 mai 2012 11h00 – 12h15

Salle: Sony

3 présentations

  • 11h00 - 11h25

    Computing Perfect Nash Equilibria for Polymatrix Games

    • Slim Belhaiza, prés., King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals

    This paper sets two alternate definitions of Perfect Nash Equilibria for Polymatrix Games. We present two linear programming formulations to identify perfect extreme equilibria and enumerate all Selten Maximal Subsets for polymatrix games. We report computational experiments on randomly generated Polymatrix games with different size and density.

  • 11h25 - 11h50

    (Anti-) Coordination Problems with Sparce Water Resources

    • Mabel Tidball, prés., INRAE
    • Katrin Erdlenbruch, Cemagref, UMR G-EAU
    • Raphael Soubeyran, Institut national de la recherche agronomique
    • Agnes Tomini, Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement de l'agriculture

    This paper analyses a groundwater pumping differential game where agents have homogeneous characteristics. We show that there may exist multiple (and possibly simultaneous) equilibria, some of them being asymmetric: for instance, a group of farmers may opt for groundwater extraction while another group chooses rainwater storage. Open-loop and feedback equilibria are computed and compared.

  • 11h50 - 12h15

    The Return Function: A New Tool for Mechanism Designers

    • Lê Nguyên Hoang, prés., GERAD - Polytechnique Montréal
    • Francois Soumis, GERAD et Polytechnique
    • Georges Zaccour, Chair in Game Theory and Management, GERAD and HEC Montréal

    In a very large range of elds, a mechanism needs to be defined to enable the interaction of agents. It usually is the responsibility of a person or a group, called the mechanism designer. It is crucial that he chooses the right rules of the game, so that the result of the game is satisfying, even though agents behave strategically. In the seminar, we will give examples of such situations. We will also present tools that can help mechanism designers optimize his mechanism.